China: The CIA Gets It.
General Michael V. Hayden, Director of the CIA, gave a speech this week at Kansas State University, on, among other things, China's future relationship with the United States. Hayden had this to say:
China, a communist-led, nuclear state that aspires to—and will likely achieve—great power status during this century, will be the focus of U.S. attention. As such, it deserves special mention today.As is often the case with issues of real consequence for our national security, there are differing views about where China is headed and what its motivations are. Let me give you Mike Hayden’s view: China is a competitor—certainly in the economic realm, and, increasingly, on the geopolitical stage. But China is not an inevitable enemy. There are good policy choices available to both Washington and Beijing that can keep us on the largely peaceful, constructive path we’ve been on for almost 40 years now.
I say that with full appreciation for the remarkable speed and scope of China’s recent military buildup. The Chinese have fully absorbed the lessons of both Gulf wars, developing and integrating advanced weaponry into a modern military force. While it’s true that these new capabilities could pose a risk to U.S. forces and interests in the region, the military modernization is as much about projecting strength as anything else. After two centuries of perceived Western hegemony, China is determined to flex its muscle. It sees an advanced military force as an essential element of great power status. And it is the Intelligence Community’s view that any Chinese regime, even a democratic one, would have similar nationalist goals.
Don’t misunderstand. The military buildup is troubling, because it reinforces long-held concerns about Chinese intentions toward Taiwan. But even without that issue, we assess that a build-up would continue—albeit one that might look somewhat different.
As important as military strength is to China today, economic development and political stability are just as central to its leaders’ thinking—as Ambassador Zhou himself made clear when he was here just 11 weeks ago. From the U.S. perspective, China’s growing engagement with the rest of the world is driven primarily by two things: a need for access to markets, resources, technology, and expertise, and a desire to assert its influence in the region and with developing countries in other parts of the world.
I should note that even as it aspires to a larger global role, China faces significant domestic challenges and structural weaknesses: things like uneven income distribution, growing dependence on foreign oil and other imported resources, environmental degradation, an aging population, and massive migration from rural areas to cities. All of these factors will influence China’s trajectory, and we can’t ignore them. But to me, the key question for the future is whether China is ready to accept the responsibility that comes along with “great power status.”
Today, China’s behavior in the international realm is focused almost exclusively on narrowly defined Chinese objectives. We saw that in the country’s dealings with Sudan, where protection of its oil interests was paramount. Let me give you another example. Two years ago, Beijing pledged to Pacific Island nations more than $370 million at a forum specifically designed to undermine Taiwan’s ties to the region. Much of China’s aid to the developing world comes with few, if any, conditions attached, which undermines the West’s own efforts to promote good governance.
Whether China begins to engage the world in ways that are less narrowly focused will greatly influence the U.S.-China relationship in the new century. If Beijing begins to accept greater responsibility for the health of the international system—as all global powers should—we will remain on a constructive, even if competitive, path. If not, the rise of China begins to look more adversarial.
I concur.
For more views on this speech, check out the following:
1. "Is China Our Enemy?" By Gordon Chang.
2. "CIA director sounds off on the future of the world," at FP Passport.
3. "Pundits talk about China," at Uncommon Misconceptions."
4. "CIA chief says China’s rapid military buildup troubling," at 1913Intel.
5. "I'd Agree With This," at Liberty Pundit.
6. "China and the CIA," at the Seminal.
Comments
Glad to see that the CIA is picking up where Admiral Falon left off, although I guess the NHYRCs of this world would have them all locked up as commie-pinko traitors.
Posted by: FOARP | May 3, 2008 5:08 PM
To best consider the above comments in their proper context, I think it would be interesting to go back in time and ask Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Nixon (from the grave) what they thought was going to happen when they started playing ping pong.
Did it all turn out as they thought or wished? Or did it turn out some other way? And why? And since "the best laid plans of mice men most often come to naught", it might be equally wise to view present alternative future scenarios in the same way. (i.e. with great caution)
That is, in 1978 (a mere 30 years ago) how many people and "senior strategists" and scenario planners (at the CIA or the KGB or elsewhere) would have predicted: a) the fall of the Soviet Union b) the rise and the spread of the Internet and ICT all over the globe c) the coming on the scene of a pandemic such as as HIV AIDS d) the pace of globalization and of economic integration (or disintegration as one might prefer) ? e) China converting to a centrally controlled "socialist market economy" ...and a few other things of that caliber and magnitutde. ....with the two Iraq wars perhaps being only additional minor blips on the screen. (but with the last one being a bit expensive and potentially holding back the U.S. economy for years and years)
And so I think that without putting the future trajectory of China in a broader and hopefully reasonably realistic context....(past projections and forecasts were mostly later proven wrong)....for instance the environmental catastrophe that is now already gradually emerging but will only gain in strength and in effects over the coming years, it is almost meaningless to consider "what to do" or "what not do" about China or its military build-up or its optimal role in the world. Personally I think it's optimal role is to release less C02 into the atmosphere and for the U.S. to do the same.
A new world is on the way, and we need to figure out what it's going to look like overall (if we can) before we can figure out what each of our respective roles in it could be, or should be. (let alone how we can influence other people's)
I am also reminded in this respect of a 30 year scenario that the World Bank's Africa Technical Department had prepared (around 1990) and also together with some quite senior African figures of what Africa would look like economically and socially thirty years down the road. And they came up with four scenarios...from most favorable to the least favorable. It was showing nicely in the window of the World Bank bookstore at 18th and H street for about 4 years. After that it was pulled. And today you can't even order it from the archives. Any lessons to be learnt here regarding the future of China?
Posted by: max jones | May 3, 2008 8:33 PM
It is the same old BS that we have seen so many times in all those Pentagon reports. "accept the responsibility that comes along with “great power status.”?
"greater responsibility for the health of the international system"? What do these mean? All of these are defined by the US. Why should China and any non-western country stick to the rules established by the US and the west?
Posted by: Pffefer | May 3, 2008 9:05 PM
Do you really think CIA is telling China what they really think ? Do you think CIA will not continue to get ready just in case ?
No country should let down their guard in terms of national security, especially not China.
Posted by: Bill | May 3, 2008 9:42 PM
Hayden's speech is somewhat misleading.
According to Webster's dictionary:
Enemy = 1: one that is antagonistic to another; especially : one seeking to injure, overthrow, or confound an opponent.
Competitor = one that competes: as a: rival
Open armed warfare is just another form of competition, just as covert warfare in various forms is competition of a lower grade than open armed warfare. Whether one describes China as a "competitor" or an "enemy", one is taking the fundamental view that the US-China relationship is antagonistic. The Chinese agree with this description.
Posted by: Steven Blayney | May 3, 2008 9:54 PM
I think it was Robert Zoellick in 2005 who first used the term "responsible stakeholder" in relation to China's rise as a great power and its emerging role in the international system. He used the term to praise what he saw as Beijing's growing maturity in international affairs, but he was mainly talking about a direction for the future. Hayden's line of thinking is similar. He argues that "the key question for the future is whether China is ready to accept the responsibility that comes along with 'great power status'"; and he calls on Beijing to "accept greater responsibility for the health of the international system".
Hayden's reasoning seems pragmatic: not too hawkish, not too doveish. But define a "responsible" foreign policy. Hayden is essentially arguing China should play by the existing rules of the international system - rules that since 1945 have largely been shaped by the United States. This much is clear when he says that "much of China’s aid to the developing world comes with few, if any, conditions attached, which undermines the West’s own efforts to promote good governance". In other words, "do it our way", "adopt our values". The onus here is on China, and only on China.
But if this is what "responsible" means, China is likely to disappoint. Why should it accept international institutions and norms as they currently stand if (and when) it has the power to change or ignore them? This is certainly not to suggest that Beijing intends to overturn the existing status quo - there is no question that China's interests are much more closely aligned with the rest of the world than they were in the past. To this extent, it HAS become more "responsible" - for example, contrast its diplomacy towards North Korea since around 2004 with its diplomacy during the 1994 crisis. But a prudent China - a China that carefully weighs up the likely outcomes of its international behaviour and actions - will be of more fundamental importance to international relations in the years ahead than a "responsible" China. If we think that China's rise can be accomodated simply by hoping for shared values then we are probably mistaken.
Posted by: NT | May 4, 2008 1:30 AM
I tend to agree with Pfeffer above. Moreover, to me, in the future World to come hopefully earlier rather than later, "great power status" may well mean being much less of a "great power" and much more of a "great global citizen"
Posted by: max jones | May 4, 2008 9:14 AM
"Why should China and any non-western country stick to the rules established by the US and the west?"
You mean like human rights and the rule of law? Why indeed?
Posted by: FOARP | May 4, 2008 2:37 PM
FOARP,
Human rights and rule of law are the rules and the principles the US stands by? You must be kidding. Maximizing US/western interests is.
Posted by: Pffefer | May 4, 2008 4:44 PM